by judicial opinion, provides a standard for critically evaluatingcurrent social practices.' The "right to refuse treatment," that "newly created constitutional right of personal autonomy,"' draws attention to the problems of institutionalized mental patients and their desires to make their own decisions to accept or reject drug therapies, particularly where severe side effects are involved. The enunciation of the right to refuse treatment, with its hard-edged overtones, forces us t o look at the tension created by the conflict between institutional attempts to treat these patients, the sometimes antithetical desire of those within the institution to control them without regard for treatment impact, and the patient's desire to retain whatever control is left to him in such settings.j its common law analogue in tort, informed consent doctrine-draws its roots from concepts of personal autonomy that pervade both tort doctrine and constitutional law. 4 The right remains poorly articulated as to its origins and reach. It is the remedy, however, for deprivations of personal autonomy that has drawn the attention ofcritics. This is proper, for it is the combination of the right and the remedy that gives meaning to the public value at stake. An effective remedy places the right firmly in place in our hierarchy of values; an ineffective remedy, or none at all, relegates the right to an abstraction or to an admonition without teeth. The utility of a damage award, the assessing of monetary costs against named defendants in litigation which is based o n the right to refuse treatment, has been little discussed in the literature. For example, no damages were assessed by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Rogers v. Okin,* for doctrinal reasons related to official immunities; damages have not been part of the remedial structure thus far considered by the federal courts. As will be discussed in this article, as the right to refuse treatment continues to
The right to refuse treatment draws its roots from concepts of personal autonomy and seems based in the constitutional right of privacy.
develop, official immunities are less likely to be available as a defense in institutional litigation. It is therefore essential to understand the law of damages, and their limits and utility in institutional reform and patient protection, so that proper remedies can be applied. I propose to use the Rogers decisions as a starting point for a preliminary assessment of the legal and instrumental role of damage remedies in cases that involve the right t o refuse medication.
Linking the Right to the Remedy
Constitutional damage remedies are complicated for two reasons. First, the availability of damages depends upon a finding of a lack of official immunity.
The immunity doctrine reflects judicial uncertainty about the relative merits of damages and the potential risk of overkill in imposing damages o n public officials. Second, several types of damages must be considered, requiring different quanta of proof by plaintiffs, dependingin part upon the nature of the constitutional principle and its relationship to its common law antecedents. O u r inquiry must therefore begin with the discussion in Rogers of the constitutional foundations of the right to refuse treatment. of the law was undeveloped, the right to refuse treatment had not been widely articulated, and the primary purpose ofdrugadministration was treatment, not punishment. The court also noted the difficult conditions under which the defendants worked:
The facilities and support staff at Boston State were marginal, at best. Incontrast, the patient popu!ation was extremely demand- 
Damages: Their Uses and Limits
Common law damages, as remedies for dignitary torts, fall into three groups: compensatory, nominal, and punitive.>' Compensatory damages aim to make the plaintiff "whole," that is, to undo the effects of the harmful act, while providing a deterrent to the defendant by shifting the cost of the plaintiff's injury onto him. Compensatory damages can be special or general. Special damages cover past pecuniary losses arising out of circumstances peculiar to the plaintiff's case; e.g., lost earnings, medical expenses, and property damage." They are recoverable only upon proof of actual loss. General damages include such items as the projected loss of income due to impairment of earningcapacity, and intangible general damages such as mental suffering and distress.
The Yet, a narrow reading of the spectrum of damage remedies available in right to refuse treatment cases leaves the plaintiff with little prospect of recovery, for several reasons. First, provable general damages may not exist. Second, special damages, like medical expenses, are also unlikely to exist in such cases, unless the patient in fact develops tardive dyskinesia or some other serious side effect. In Rogers, the benchmark for measuring harm to the plaintiffs waselusive. Plaintiffs presented noevidence that they suffered from tardive dyskinesia, the most severe and dramatic of the drug-related side effects. Since the medication does control symptoms which might otherwise be disruptive or damaging to the patient, a definition of physical harm is hard to apply. Additionally, a schizophrenic patient, given his psychological state, has special difficulties in trying to prove mental distress. Plaintiffs are therefore presented with prodigious problems of proof in such cases. Third, nominal damages, while requiring that the defendant recognize the plaintiffs right by means of the token payment, tend to trivialize it at the same time, since they fail to convey the heft to the right and its ranking on a hierarchy of values. Fourth, punitive damages suffer from two limitations: malice must be proved, and the punitive award must be reasonably related to the actual damages suffered. Given the judicial recognition in Rogers of the shortcomings of state funding and the disruptive nature of the patients, courts are unlikely to find the requisite level ofmalicious intent required for the imposition of punitive damages.
What is missing in the right to refuse treatment cases is the availability of presumed damages. While the Su- The function of a damage remedy, like that of equitable and structural remedies, is to alter behavior through judicially imposed devices. Thus, the District Court in Rogers considered a structural remedy of a judicially appointed guardian when a patient refused treatment. The Court of Appeals, finding such a mechanism to be "impractical and largely incapable of enfor~ement,"~' suggested a mechanism for "periodic review by non-treating physicians" of the treatment given to patients. In Rennie o. K f e i~~,~' the federal District Court in New Jersey imposed an elaborate extra-judicial system in which patients had access to patient advocates and were assured that an informal review of their case by an independent psychiatrist would occur "before the hospital may forcibly medicate an involuntary patient."" The choice of procedural measures relates to a judicial perception that such measures can effectively alter institutional behavior to decrease the intrusive medicatingof patients. Such a presumption in favor of procedural barriers or external review of medication decisions may not, however, properly balance a patient's right to refuse treatment with necessary treatment flexibility. Will such procedural remedies "give treating physicians too much control and arguably too little acco~ntability?"~~ Will such remedies prove futile, because of successful circumvention by staff? Or will the complexities they introduce affect professional morale and practice so adversely that treatment suffers?s6 The argument in favor of equitable relief in constitutional tort cases is twofold:
(1) it provides a clear and specific command to those in the institution, unlike damage remedies which create only generalized incentives toward change on the part of the institutional defendants; (2) since the relief is usually aimed at the institution, and at its procedures and structures, it seems fairer as well as potentially more effective than an award of damages since it is often an institutional problemscarce resources, poorly managed staff-that is at issue, rather than the culpability of individual therapist^.^'
In contrast to equitable remedies, which impose procedural review mechanisms or guardian procedures, damages act indirectly. The assumption is that the imposition of monetary costs on an individual will lead him to reassess the effects that his actions have on others, pushing him toward a more acceptable personal calculation which accounts for the values inherent in the constitutional norm. 
